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THE REAL "NATURAL LAW"
A Comparative Study *
"At different times, among the same people, law will be natural...
or learned .... Law grows with the growth and strengthens with the
strength, of the people." SAVIGNY.
"Law dwells not in a special system of decrees which forsee and de-
fine possible forms of non-fulfilment and provide appropriate barriers
and remedies." MALINOWSKI.
I. INTRODUCTORY.
The phrase "natural law" which so long and so conspicu-
ously figured in western legal terminology I is now quite gen-
erally discarded if not discredited.2 Its association with
what Maine ' terms "two legal superstitions" - the "social
compact" and the "lost code of nature" - may never have
been accepted by the philosophers 4 but has contributed not
a little to the result above noted.
Nevertheless I believe that we have had, and still have, a
form of law which fully deserves the designation of "natural"
and which modern legal anthropology shows to have been the
earliest form. I refer to what is commonly called "customary
*Read before the Riccobono Seminar of Roman Law at Washington. Nov. 27.
1939.
1 "The term 'Law of Nature' or 'Natural Law' has been in use, in various
applications, ever since the . . later Roman republic" and "has a perfectly con-
tinuous history down to the date of its greatest and most beneficent achievement
. . the foundation of modem Law of Nations by Grotius." PoLLocK, ESSAYS IN
THE LAW (1922) 31 sq.
2 Messrs. Wu and Liang, the brilliant young Chinese jurists, devote Book
V of their collection, EssAYs IN JURTSPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHrLosoPny, to "The
Problem of Natural Law," in which the six essayists (two British, three American
and one German) all seem to agree that the phrase, if not the concept, has become
obsolete. "It seems to have vanished from the sphere of politics as well as from
positive law." BRYCE, 2 STUDIES nr HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901) 604. See
Gurvitch, Natural Law, 11 ENcYc. or SocIAL SCIFN'CES 284.
3 ANCIENT LAW (Pollock's Ed.), 86.
4 POLLOCK, ante n. I at p. 34.
THE'REAL "NATURAL LAW"
law." I It deserves to be called "natural" because, like the
forest, it grows without man's direct intervention.
The historical jurists 6 were wont to compare the origin
and growth of customary law with those of language, claim-
ing for each a "natural" and parallel evolution. The com-
parison was criticized by Ihering; 7 but it seems to be sound.
No doubt various factors enter into the growth of each; but
they are mostly "natural" factors; none is entirely a product
of human will as is, for the most part, "positive" law.7"
II. ORIGIN AND NATURE.
1. In General. To understand customary law we must
first analyze custom; for, as I have elsewhere had occasion
to say,' "in its origin, customary law appears to be only a
differentiated form of general custom." This is well illustrated
by the fact that certain peoples use the same term for custom
and for law,' pointing backward to the time when the two
were identical.
5 See my article on that subject in 4 ENCyc. OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 662
sq.
6 "For law as for language, there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is
subject to the same movement as every other popular tendency; and this very
development remains under the same law of inward necessity as in its earliest
stages." SAVIGNY, UBER DEN BERUF UNSERER ZEIT ZUR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHIT-
sissNscHA r (Berlin, 1814) Hayward's trans., 24, 27. "Through this common
consciousness of recht, as by a common language and a common religion, people
are bound together in a definite union." PUCHTA, (Hastie's trans., as) OUT'IES
OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE or RIGHT (Edinburgh, 1887), 30.
7 DER Zwacx ra REcHT (Leipzig, 1877) translated by Lalor (Chicago, 1879).
7" "fits positivum was a title invented by mediaeval jurists to denote law made
or established by human authority; as opposed to that jus naturale which was
uncreated and immutable .... All is positive which is not natural." SALMOND, JUR-
ISPRUDENCE (9th., Parker's, ed., 1937) 45, citing AQUINAS, SuSImA, 2q., 57 (DE
JuRa), Art. 2. Austin calls positive, law "set by men to men." JURISPRUDENCE, 1.
III. See also BROWN, THE AUSTINIAN THEORY OF LAW (London, 1912), 235.
Bentham adopted the concept and Maine comments: ". . . the farther we penetrate
into the primitive history of thought. the farther we find ourselves from a con-
ception of law which at all resembles a compound of the elements which Bentham
determined. It is certain that, in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature,
or even a distinct author of law is contemplated or conceived of. Law has scarcely
reached the footing of custom; it is rather a habit . . . to use a French phrase,
'in the air'." ANCIENT LAW (Pollock's ed.) 7, 8.
8 Ante n. 5.
9 E. g. zakon among the Slavic nations; "batason" among the Manobos.
GARvAN, NATIONAL ACADE-MY MEMOIRS, XXIII.
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According to Pollock 10
"Custom, except in distinctly technical applications which are really
pan of a developed legal system, seems to have no primary meaning
beyond that of a rule or habit of action which is in -fact used or ob-
served (perhaps we may say consciously ...) by some body or class
of persons."
Nor does the newest school of legal anthropologists dis-
pute the relationship thus indicated - rather, in fact rec-
ognizes it in, justifiably, "demanding a new line of anthropo-
logical fieldwork: the study by direct observation of the
rules of custom as they function in actual life." " The new
school's founder concedes that
"The Melanesian of the (Trobriand) region treated has unquestion-
ably the greatest respect for his tribal custom, and tradition as such....
All the rules of his tribe, trivial or important, pleasant or irksome, moral
or utilitarian, are regarded by him with reverence and felt to be ob-
ligatory." 12
But Malinowski 11 protests the assumption "that all custom
is law to the savage and that he has no law but his custom,"
draws "a clear distinction of primitive law from other forms
of custom," 1' sets the former "apart from other types of
customary rules" "5 and maintains "that the rules of law
form but one well defined category within the body of cus-
tom." 16 Thus he arrives at "a revised definition of law as a
special class of customary rules," viz., those
10 FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE (1929) 10.
11 MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (London, 1926), 125.
"To the old recorders what mattered really, was the queerness of the custom, not
its reality. . Many of the earlier accounts were written to startle. to amuse, to
be facetious at the savage's expense (illustrating) ; till the tables were turned and
it is now easier to be facetious at the anthropologist's expense." (lb. 126-7).
.22 lb. 64-5, adding: "The natives . . .have to conform, e. g., to a very
exacting type of religious ritual, especially at burial and in mourning."
13 lb. 63.
14 lb. 15.
15 lb. 39 "The rules of law stand out from the rest in that they are felt and
regarded as the obligations of one person and the rightful claims of another." lb.
55. Malinowski later expressed himself as "deeply convinced that there is one
type of rules which differ, by nature, sanction, relations to human instincts and
. ..-to social structure, from all the other rules of conduct." Introduction to
HOGBrN, LAW AND ORDER IN POLYNESIA (1934), lxxii.
16 Ante n. 11 at p. 54. "They do not form this amorphous mass of tribal
usage or 'cake of custom' of which we have been hearing so much." lb. 66.
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"which curb human inclinations, passions or instinctive drives ...
which protect the rights of one citizen against the concupiscence, cupid-
ity or malice of the other and which pertain to sex, property and
safety." 18
Finally he seeks
"to show that in all social relations and in all the various domains of
tribal life, exactly the same legal mechanism can be traced, that it
places the binding obligations in a special category and sets them apart
from other types of customary rules." ".,
2. Custom as Law. Not infrequently, however, custom
is termed a "source" of law. As well speak of law itself as a
"source"; for custom, as thus limited above, is law - differ-
ing from other forms only in certain nonessential features. "
Hence the popular notion of "savagery" as practically syn-
onymous with anarchy, is wide of the mark.
"Our first impression, of these primitive. people," writes Dr. Sollas,2 1
"is that of surprise at the extraordinary extent to which life is gov-
erned by rule. Law and order are ... enforced as strictly as in some
civilized lands. A moral code, different, no doubt, in many respects
from our own, is universally recognized."
So Malinowski1 2 emphasizes "the reality of law," hail-
ing "the gradual but definite recognition that savagery is not
ruled by moods, passions and accidents, but by tradition and
order." 23 To him
"The fundamental function of law is to curb certain natural propen-
sities, to hem in and control human instincts, and to impose a non-
spontaneous, compulsory behaviour - in other words to insure a type
of co-operation based on mutual concessions for a common end." 24
17 lb. 124.
Is Introduction to HoGBix, ante n. 15. Cf. ante n. 11 at p. 64.
11 lb. 39.
20 "The great bulk of the rules which determine the relations of individuals
or groups to one another have, in most countries, until comparatively recent times,
rested upon custom-that is to say, upon long settled practice which everybody
understands and in which everybody acquiesces. In such countries customs were
or are laws and need not be formally enounced in order to secure observance."
BRYCE, ante n. 2 at II, 499.
21 AacrEXT HtNERS AND THEIR MODERN REPRFSENT.TIVES (London, 1934),
283.
22 Ante n. 18 at lxi-lxvii.
23 Ante n. 11 at p. 72. "Even the chief," he points out, "has to conform to.
strict norms and is bound by legal fetters." lb. 46.
94 lb. 64.
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This indeed, is one of the features which distinguishes
man from the "lower" animals. Hence, Malinowski's defini-
tion of law, reduced to its lowest terms, is "effective social
constraint." -" Probably the earliest "law" consisted largely
of tabus - prohibitions with a curse. For, according to
Wundt,26 "tabu has not merely the force of a police law; ...
it is a religious law whose transgression is eventually pun-
ished by death." Barton . tells us that "a small part of
Ifugao law consists even yet of tabus that are arbitrary and,
except in essence, unreasonable."
The effectiveness of this primitive law is further illus-
trated by the difficulties encountered in changing it. In
Sumatra, "the chiefs have no right to repeal, alter or modify"
custom; a new precedent is accepted as binding only after
it has been submitted to the people of the doosoon (vil-
lages).28 So in early Rome, any modification of mos (cus-
tom), such as adoption or change in the order of succession
required sanction by the comitia (popular assembly). 9
The older writers on "jurisprudence" thought "judicial
recognition" necessary in order that custom may become
law;" ° but Malinowski "1 found a people, apparently with-
out courts, who nevertheless have an "extremely well de-
veloped" legal system - the result of a conflict between
subsidiary systems, one of which ultimately became the pre-
vailing law. It may be difficult to place one's finger upon the
precise time when such triumph occurred and the prevailing
system became recognized as such; but there must have been
such a time. It is when
25 lb. 32.
26 ELEUMENTE DER VOLKERPSYCHOLOGIE (Leipzig, 1912); Schnaub's trans.
(London, 1916), 193, 204.
27 IFUGAo LAW, University of California Pubs. in American Archaeology and
Ethnology (1919) XV, No. 1, p. 13.
28 FEATHERMAN, HISTORY OF THE RACES OF MANKIND (London, 1880 sq.) at
II, 311.
29 See my EVOLUTION OF ROMAN LAW (1923), 55.
30 HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE (9th ed. 1900), 540; CLARK, ROMAN PRIVATE
LAW; JURISPRUDENCE (Cambridge, 1014), 1. 350-1.
31 Ante n. 11.
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"there is . need to encroach on self-interest and inertia, to prod into
unpleasant action, or thwart innate propensities" that there arise "other
rules, dictates and imperatives, which require and possess their special
type of sanction besides the mere glamour of tradition." 32
Other Requisites. "Canons or conditions . . laid down
by English writers IS as to validity" (of custom), observes
Clark, 4 "do not depend entirely on principles peculiar to
English law, but on such as are fairly matter of general juris-
prudence."
Naturally custom must be "established" 11 (accepted) be-
fore it acquires validity - i. e. becomes customary law. All
of the customs mentioned by Malinowski are apparently of
long standing; and while many of these will be discarded "
as the group advances, others gain in prestige by the lapse
of time. Thus antiquity comes to be regarded as a "requisite"
of customary law."
32 lb. 65.
33 POLLOCK, ante n. 10 at pp. 281-3; SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed.) at
pp. 140 sq.; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs, 76-78, referring to particular customs
but "in part ... also applicable to custom of the whole realm." CLARK, ante n.
30 at I, 403.
34 lb.
85 "The conditions of certainty and continuity are little more than matter
of definition-they are essential to any idea of custom." lb. 404. "In the case of
a widely-spread local custom, want of continuity would be evidence that it never
had a legal existence; but it is difficult to imagine that such a custom, once thor-
oughly established, should come to a sudden end." MAYNE, HINDU LAW AND
USAGE, (9th ed., 1922) 59.
36 "There is good reason for classing together (as they are classed by Pol-
lock) the somewhat indefinite condition of reasonableness and that of presumed
recognition of an obligatory character in the custo&,, which is called opinio neces-
satatis." CLARK, ante n. 30 at pp. 404-5. Cf. MAYNE, ante n. 35 p. 61, citing
Manu Code, VIII, 42.
37 Hindu Law. "Nor can a family custom ever be binding where the family
or estate to which it attaches is so modem as to preclude the very idea of im-
memorial usage." MAYNE, ante n. 35.
Canon Law. "The requirement of immemorial antiquity was introduced
into the English law courts of the 12th or 13th century from the Canon law...
The Canonists attempted to supply a defect of the Civil Law by laying down a
fixed rule as to the necessary duration of customs. They determined that no
consuetudo was to be held valid, as to.derogate from the jus commune, unless it
was praescripta, i. e. had endured for the legal period of prescription. Consuetudo
praescripta praejudicat juri communi." SALMOND, ante n. 33 at pp. 146-7.
Anglican Law. "Very long or immemorial duration is an indefinite qual-
ification which will necessarily be interpreted in different ways by different legal
systems and under different historical conditions. It is generally spoken of as
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III. PRECEDENT.
Precedent is the core of custom. 3 In most of our activities
we do as others have done before, thus forming a "habit." "'
When a sufficient number have formed the same "habit" it
becomes a "custom." Holland 'o illustrates the origin of cus-
tom by
"The mode in which a path is formed across a common. One man
crosses .. .in the direction suggested either by the purpose he has in
view or by mere accident. If others follow in the same track, which
they are likely to do after it has once been trodden, a path is made."
So Pollock 41 observes:
"It is notorious that young children will appeal to precedent in sup-
port of their requests almost as soon as they can frame a coherent sen-
tence. They will allege, if they can, the leave of a competent authority
as already had - as by offering such a plea as, 'Mamma lets me do it,'
to a father's prohibition of sports threatening danger to the child or
destruction to furniture. But if the authority referred to turns out (as
genterally happens) not to support the argument, the child's artless
cunning falls back on the defence of bare precedent. 'One day I did
it,' or words to that effect, are brought out with an air of perfect serious-
ness and confidence; and, though the plea is overruled, it is at least
doubtful whether the pleader is intellectually satisfied. It may be sus-
confined, in its application, to local custom in England, but must surely have been,
in fact, true of the general national customs recognized by the Anglo-Norman
judges as prevailing throughout the realm, equally with those which prevailed only
in certain parts of it." CLARK, ante n. 30 at p. 404.
Mohammedan Law. "It is not necessary that it should have had its origin
in the time of the companions of the Prophet; but it does not appear what time
must elapse before a custom will be accepted by the court." ABDER RAreM, MO-
HAMMEDAN JURISPRUDENCE (London, 1911), 137.
38 "The relationship between precedent and custom is a thorny question.
Analytically I believe it right to distinguish the two ...but it remains true that
(they) have not always been distinguished.'" Jolowicz, Precedent in Greek and
Roman Law (MS); read before the Riccobono Seminar of Roman Law, May 11,
1939. Prof. Evans. whose paper (Custom and Precedent in the Roman Lay
Writers) was read on the same occasion, found it "difficult to distinguish, in many
cases, between precedent and customs." But he pointed out that "the normal
word for the former is exemplum. It seems that many exempla give rise to a
mos.' In other words, while one swallow doesn't make a summer, a sufficient
number of precedents make a custom.
39 "Custom is simply the result of the disposition to do again what has been
done before. What habit is to the individual, custom is to the community."
BRYCE, ante n. 2 at II, 499, 500.
40 Ante n. 30 at p. 540.
41 ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS (London, 1882), 56.
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pected that we have, in these involuntary revelations of infant logic,
the true primitive form of the universal argument of archaic conserva-
tism."
Probably no legal system has remained entirely uninflu-
enced by precedent; though in some it is more marked than
in others.
"The force of habit, the awe of traditional command, and a senti-
mental attachment to it, the desire to satisfy public opinion - all com-
bine to make custom.., obeyed for its own sake. In this the 'savages'
do not differ from the members of any self-contained community with
a limited horizon, whether this be an Eastern European ghetto, an Ox-
ford college, or a Fundamentalist, Middlewest community." 42
Semitic. Accordingly in the earliest legal system-the Baby-
lonian - of which we have even fairly complete records,
"The laws of both peoples (Sumerian and Semite) are based upon
a long history of case decisions and hence the Sumerian word for law
means a judgment made known.... Long before tablets of Sumerian
law codes were discovered,43 a great many Sumerian legal decisions
or rulings on disputes by Sumerian law courts, were known. We now
possess about sixty well preserved documents of this kind, all from
Lagash of the period of the Ur dynasty (B. C. 2474-2357)." 44
Speaking of the legal precedents in the Pentateuch, Sulz-
berger 41 observes
"In each the facts are narrated and the principle of the decision an-
nounced for guidance in the future. They constitute what we call
case law as distinguished from statute law and what the Hebrews call
Talmud in contradistinction to Mishpatim 46 or Torah."
Rabbi Jehuda (Judah, ca. 200 A. D.) is credited with the
compilation, in its present form, of the Mishna, or "author-
42 MALIzowsir, ante n. 11 at p. 52.
43 "The newly discovered Sumerian law code is entitled, 'The Decisions of
Nisaba (goddess of writing) and Hani' (lord of the seal)." EDWARDS, THE
WoRLD's EARLIEST LAWS (London, 1904), 60.
44 Langdon, The Sumerian Law Code Compared with Hammurabi's, JouwAx
ROYAL AsrATc Soc. (1920), 490-1. Cf. JoHNs, BABYLONIAN AND AssYRIAN LAWS,
CONTRACTS AND LL=Rs (New York, 1904) 39, where he speaks of the "large num-
ber of legal decisions which recorded the ruling of some judicial functionary on
points of law." See also his Ch. VI.
45 ANcIENT HEBREW LAW or HoCcmIE (Philadelphia, 1915), 9.
46 See WALLIS, GOD AND THE SOCIAL PROCESS (Chicago, 1935), 17. Cf. 9, 12.
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ized codification of the oral or unwritten law," 1'  which af-
forded the text of the Talmud, and is said to have
"arranged the heterogeneous mass of upwards of 4,000 traditional
Halakoth or Mishniyoth (precedents, doctrines) into six Sedarim (cate-
gories, orders), which he subdivided into sixty-three Mesikhtotk (treat-
ises) and then into 523 Perakim (fragments, chapters)." 41
Says Sulzberger, "
"The memory and results of this steady accunmulation of case law.
during a period of perhaps fifteen hundred years, are preserved to a
small degree and to a much greater degree in the Talmud."
For
"In Rabbinic teaching, precedent reigned supreme. . . . The pre-
dominant formulae of the Talmud are appeals to the assertions of Rab-
bis " 51
Again
"Among the Arabs to this day," says Robertson Smith,-' "traditional
precedents are the essence of law and the Cadi is he who has inherited a
knowledge of them."
Chinese. "From time immemorial," says a young lawyer
of that country, "China was known as a nation governed by
rites and precepts." In fact, there, more than in any other
country, custom rules; and, in consequence, precedent has
played a preeminent part in Chinese law. Respect for it is
already noticeable in Confucius, who, probably more than
any other, may be called the Lawgiver of China." 'b And not
only did he follow precedent; he made it. "A quotation from
Confucius has settled many a quarrel, arbitrated many a dis-
47 MIELZNER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD (3d. ed., 1925) 4, 5.
48 MENDELSOHN, CRIUIN.AL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ANCIENT HEBREWS (1891),
225.
.I1) Ante n. 45, p. 0.
0 FARRAR, HISTORY OF INTERPRETATION (London, 1886), 88.
51 TEE: OLD TESTAMENT IN THE JEWISH CHURCH (2nd. ed., 1902), 331.
510 SHENG, (R. C. W.), Selected Cases From the Han Dynasty (B. C. 206-
CHINA LAW REv. I, 437 (1924.)
51b DISCOURSES AND SAYINGS Or CONFUCIUS (Ku Hung-Ming's trans., Shang-
hai, 1898), .Ch. VII, § 34, p. 57: "On one occasion when Confudus was ill, a dis-
ciple asked that he allow prayers to be offered for his recovery. 'Is it the cus-
tom?' asked the Sage. 'Yes,' replied the disciple, 'in the Book of Rituals for the
Dead it is written, 'Pray to the powers above and to the powers below.' 'Ah,'
said Confucius, 'then my prayer has been a lifelong one.'"
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pute." "' Even today, according to the text of current
Chinese Supreme Court Decisions, customs prevail "in the
absence of express provisions" and "are applied to the ex-
clusion of ordinary legal principles."
Greek. Professor Jolowicz, in his learned paper, 2 finds,
not that precedent and custom were wanting in Greek law
but that when Hellas "emerges into the full light of history,"
the period of customary law has passed and few, traces re-
main in the material which has come down to us. It was still
found in Sparta and the orators "I and philosophers 4 rec-
ognize it as a factor. Indeed Vinogradoff " tells us that an-
cestral custom formed an important part of Hellenic law.
Perhaps the contrary notion has arisen from the prominence
given to the Heliastic Courts of later Athens, which were
like our juries and therefore unsuited for making' prece-
dents."
Roman. "Precedent was the very essence of Roman pub-
lic life and ... the Romans found a large place for what we
may call 'precedent' in the wide sense in their legal sys-
tem." 17 Throughout its existence its influence is noticeable,
beginning with the interpretation by the pontiffs,58 continu-
ing in the praetor's edict,5" and the responsa prudentium of
the jurisconsuts,6 ° culminating in the imperial rescripts and
510 Hotco=E, Tim REAL CmlAiW, (N. Y. 1895), 45.
52 Ante n. 38.
53 "Demosthenes (LVI, § 48, p. 129) in the speech against Dionysiodorus,
reminds his hearers that they will be legislating for the whole market and that
there are numerous merchants waiting to hear the judgment." lb. 3.
54 PLAxo LAWS, (VII, 793) "recognizes tradition as an important feature in
laws." lb. Cf. ARxsmTo-r., Ermcs, Nic. 10, 9. 180a.
55 HISTORIC.L JURISPRUDmCE (1920), II, 75.
56 See DORJAHN, PHm.LoGIcAL QuAa. VII, 375.
57 JoLowicz, ante n. 38 at pp. 12, 24.
58 Mloammsa, HisTORy op Romm (Rev. ed. 1911) H, 213. Cf. Som., Row
LAW (Leslie's ed.), 62.
59 Jor.owicz, ante n. 38 at pp. 13 sq. Cf. my EvoLuTIoN or THE Ro3"N LAw
(1923), 113.
60 Jorowcz, lb. pp. 14 sq.
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other documents emanating from the emperor 81 and even in
actual court decisions.
Romanesque. The great dramatist makes Portia, func-
tioning as the Duke's delegata in what must have been a
Civil Law court at Venice, deprecate a certain course, be-
cause,
"T'will be recorded for a precedent
And many an error,
Through the same intending,
Will rush into the state."
But probably no modern, Civil Law court would accord such
force to judicial precedent which, in that system, is termed
"jurisprudence." ", Indeed, the parent Civil Code even for-
bids judges "to lay down general rules or follow previous de-
cisions." 6 On the other hand the force of Roman tradition
is still so strong that "doctrine," consisting of the opinions of
eminent commentators, and corresoonding to the responsa of
the prudentes, retains its authority and affords an accumula-
tion of precedents of a different sort but highly respected.6"
Anglican. Here the Roman tradition never fully took
root and that which Pollock 66 terms "an unreasoning ten-
dency to do... again.., what has been done once," is mani-
fest at an early day. Bracton (13th Century) "collected 500
decisions from the mile long rolls of the (King's) Court and
uses them as his authorities. For him, English law is already
case law." "' Later in the same century, the first of the earli-
61 lb. 12 sq.; CLARx, RoNAN PRIVATE LAW (Jurisprudence), I, 352 sq.
62 JOLOWICz, lb. 16 sq.
63 See my MODERN CiviL LAW, Corpus Juris, XL, 1250. Cf. Gray, Judicial
Precedents, 9 HARD. L. REV., 33-35.
64 FREN H CIVIL CoDE, Art. 5 (2).
6. Ante n. 63 at p. 1249.
66 ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND E-ruics (London, 1882), 54.
67 MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS (Cambridge. 1911) II, 444. But in another
work, BRACrON's NoTE Boox (London, 1887) I, 40 sq. Maitland calls Bracton's De
Legibus "a treatise on English law as administered by Pateshull and Raleigh"-
two judges who sat in the courts whose decisions are the ones mainly cited. In
Glanvill's book of the preceding century, "there seems to be but one reference to
a decision." GRAY, ante n. 63 at p. 36.
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est series of English law reports - the YEAR BooKs " - ap-
peared - forerunners of that enormous volume of this "case
law" which already burdens our libraries but which continues
to increase in every English speaking country, especially the
United States, with its more than 50 "supreme" courts. Re-
versing the situation in the Civil Law, its "doctrine," which
is all but disregarded in the Anglican, is applied 1, to a judg-
ment or judicial opinion " to be followed in similar cases
according to the rule of stare decisis (whose critics term it
"precedent worship"). Thus, "in practice, if not in theory,
the common law of England has been created by the decisions
of English judges." 1 Well did Tennyson call that country
"A land of old and sure renown;
A land of settled government
Where freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent." 72
68 "In the first YEAR BooK yet printed . .. (20 & 21 Edw. I, 1292-3) the
references to decisions are few and.brief. . .The last year which appears in the
Ym Booxs is 27 Hen. VIII (1535) and of it only three terms are reported.
Judicial decisions are more frequently cited.. .The practice of citation blossomed
out in Lord Coke. Opening in the middle of his* reports we find in the first 25
folios of the seventh volume, 228 references to cases-an average 20 times greater
than that of Plowden ...one of the most famous and accurate of reporters..
a generation after the Year Books." Gray, ante n. 63 at pp. 36, 38.
69 "Doctrine" in English law includes that part of an opinion which states and
disposes of the question or questions presented by the case. Properly, no opinion
should contain more; but the discursive tendency of the average judge often re-
sults in the injection of other observations and discussions. These are termed
obiter dicta (sayings on the way) and bind no one-not even those who utter
them. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 399 (1821). "Lawyers fully recognize
that it is unsafe to rely on a general statement of law, however solemnly adopted
by the court, which is not necessary to the decision." POLLOCx, ante n. 66 at p.
257.
70 "We are to look farther in a case than to the judgment to find that which
constitutes a precedent. It is found in the rules of law which are the foundation
of a judgment.. . A case is to be regarded as a precedent when it furnishes rules
that may be applied in settling the rights of parties. Those rules are to be dis-
covered in the opinions of the judges and constitute the reason for the decision."
Dubuque v. R. Co., 39 Ia. 56, 79, 80 (1874).
"A decision creates a precedent whether there be an opinion or not; but
unless there be an opinion there cannot be a very useful or weighty precedent."
WAmAuGH, TnE STUDY or CAs Es'(2nd ed., 1894), 23.
71 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE '(5th ed.), 159. But see post note 122.
72 "In the United States the generil rule and practice as to the weight due
a precedent in the court which made it, or in a court of coordinate jurisdiction,
is substantially the same as in England.. Naturally, considering the character of
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It was once the theory 73 that judicial decisions were mere-
ly declaratory of the law then existing. While rejecting this,
Salmond, 74 along with other analytical jurists, classifies prec-
edents into declaratory and original. But there would seem
to be little use for a merely declaratory precedent (i. e., one
which follows another) for, unless a decision announces new
"doctrine," it can hardly be called a "precedent" at all. Nor
have all precedents the same force. The decision of a court
- even the highest - in another jurisdiction is no more than
persuasive and even within a jurisdiction, only a decision of
the court of last resort is binding on others.
IV. FORM.
By this I mean the law's medium of expression, whether
by word of mouth or in writing. Of course the earliest "law"
was unwritten; for law existed milleniums before invention
of the graphic art. There must have been many instances of
this; but one which was but recently brought to light will
serve as an example. The "Iroquois Code," used by the five
(later six) nations of what is now New York and Canada,
was never reduced to writing by the Indians themselves but
"for centuries . . . was handed down by word of mouth." 71
In Sparta, according to Prof. Jolowicz 6 "the foundation of
the state was the retra of Lycurgus, which was no less a
statute because the Spartan lawgiver forbade the laws to be
the people, and of institutions, the weight attached to judicial precedent is some-
what less than in England; but the difference will hardly admit of any precise
definition." GRAY, ante n. 63 at p. 40.
73 WAMBAUGH, ante n. 70 at § § 17, 18. Cf. SALMOND, ante n. 71 at Ch.
VIII. "The theory was at first much more thoroughly believed . . . than . . .
now; and, indeed it may have had a better foundation. The judges of the 13th
century may have really had at their command a mine of law unrevealed to the
bar and to the lay-public; for there is some reason for suspecting that in secret
they borrowed freely, though not always wisely, from current compendia of the
Roman and Canon laws. But that storehouse was closed as soon as the points de-
cided at Westminster Hall became numerous enough to supply a basis for a sub-
stantive system of jurisprudence." MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, 32, 33.
74 Ante n. 73.
75 See Hewitt MSS, Smithsonian Institution.
70 Ante n. 38.
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written down; they were committed to memQry, as indeed
Justinian says."
As the rules of customary law become fixed and recognized,
their expression takes the form of terse maxims which are
easily committed to writing after that art is acquired. "The
expression in clear and memorable sayings of the rules im-
plied in the decisions ... to primitive men seemed law mak-
ing." 
77
"The laws-of the (XII) tables were of remarkable brevity, terseness
and pregnancy, with something of a rythmical cadence that must have
greatly facilitated their retention in the memory." 78
"Their style is thoroughly rugged and archaic - short, pregnant
sentences evidently intended for the comprehension of the vulgar and
suitable for transmission from mouth to mouth, framed in the impera-
tive mood." 70
Even so late as the youth of Cicero, he tells us,s0 they formed
part of the Roman schoolboy's instruction.
According to Maine 11
"The law book of Manu is in verse ... one of the expedients for les-
sening the burden which the memory has to bear when writing is un-
known or very little used. But there is another expedient .-. . aphorism
or proverb. Even now, in our own country, much of popular wisdom
is preserved either in old rhymes or in old proverbs; and it is well as-
certained that, during the Middle Ages, much of law and not a little of
medicine was preserved among professions, not necessarily clerkly, by
these two agencies. A great deal of old- German law, compressed into
maxims, has been preserved; and it is probable that the Latin legal
maxims,82 well known to English lawyers, and sometimes spoken of as
the quintessence of wisdom, were really aids to recollection."
Again
77 MUNROE SMITH, A GENERAL VIEW OF EUROPEAN LEGAL HISToRY (New
York, 1927), 290.
78 GouDY, 17 juPmicAL REV. 100.
79 MUIRHEAD, ROMAN LAW, (1916), 100.
80 DE LEGIBUS, II, 28, § 59.
81 EARLy LAW AND CUSTOM, 9. 10.
82 See Smith (Jeremiah), The Use of Maxims in Jurisprudence, 9 Harv. L.
Rev. 13. Cf. the present writer's "Equity," Am. & ENG. E.%cvc. oF LAW (2nd. ed.),
VI.
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"In Sir William Jones's day an abridgment of Lord Coke's 'Reports'
in verse 83 was in existence; and he gravely remarks that if the verse
had been smoother and the law more accurate, every student might have
been advised to use it. Now the Sanscrit law-books are sometimes in
aphoristic prose, sometimes in verse, sometimes in a mixture of both;
and the canon established by Max Muller is that, in India at all events,
books of aphorisms are older than books of verse; and the clue being
once found, many more proofs disclose themselves that Manu, which is
wholly in verse, is much more recent than the Hindu law-books (such
as Apastamba and Gautama which are wholly in aphoristic prose) and
even more modem than books (like Vishnu and Vasishtha) which are
partly in prose and. partly in verse." 84
Probably all of these collections, as well as the original
decalogues, existed in the form of poetry long before they
were reduced to graphic form; and even when that occurred,
it was not necessarily the form we know. "The Aztec law,"
says Featherman," "was recorded in ideographic painting
which served as guidance to the courts."
Maine 8 also tells us that "except this (customary) there
is no ... unwritten law;" and some have used the two terms
as if synonymous, 7 but it must not be assumed that cus-
tomary law ceases to be such merely by its reduction to
writing. That involves a change in form only; source and
sanction remain the same save in those few instances where
customary law is "reenacted"- a process which adds little
if anything to its validity. In three leading European coun-
tries - Spain, France and Germany - the reduction of cus-
tomary law to written form was especially noteworthy."8
In Spain, these compilations came to be known as Jueros,s9
many of which appeared from the 10th to the 13th cen-
s3 Cf. Pollock's "Leading Cases Done Into Verse."
84 Ante n. 81 at pp. 10, 11.
85 Ante n. 28.
86 ANCIENT LAW, 13.
87 "Custom is unwritten law, peculiar to particular localities." 10 HAts-
BURY'S ENCYC. Or THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 218; Lockwood v. Wood, 6 Q. B. 50,
Ex. Ch. (1844).
88 See my CUSTomARY LAW, ante n. 5; Reception of Roman Law, Nat. Univ.
L. Rev., XI, No. 1 pp. 59 sq.
89 From Latin forum. "Fuero is the custom reduced to writing. . . The fuero
is called jus from use (usus), whence fuero is derived from forum because it is
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turies. The most influential of those in France was probably
the COUTEME DE PARIS 90 which ultimately became the basis
of civilized law in Nouvelle France and Louisiana."1 "Of
all productions of the German mind within the domain of
law," wrote Henry Adams, 2 "the SACHENSPIEGEL " was
the purest and greatest;" and it was a compilation of land-
recht (general customary law) and lehnrecht (feudal cus-
tom).
V. REPOSITORY.
By this I mean the place wherein, or the means whereby,
law may be found. Among the contemporary Iboo people of
Nigeria, the elders, after adopting a new rule, go home and
"inform their kindred of the law." "
"Before the invention of writing," says Maine,95 "and during the
infancy of the art, an aristocracy invested with judicial privileges
formed the only expedient by which accurate preservation of the cus-
toms of the race or tribe, could be at all approximated. ... Their gen-
uineness was so far as possible, insured by confiding them to the recol-
lection of a limited portion of the community."
It was Munroe Smith's view ," "that customary law, as dis-
tinguished from mere usage, has always been developed by
decisions" which "have always been determined by a rela-
tively small number of persons." De la Grasserie " challenges
that view. "Custom is custom," he insists. "It is neither an
extension of theocracy nor anticipation of judge declared
law." Still it is clear that, in its early stages, law did grow
public and manifest." MADDEN, POLITICAL THEORY AND LAW IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN
(London, 1930), 66, 67, citing Gloss of Lopez.
90 See Ferrierre's version (2d. ed. Paris, 1714); SCHMIDT, HISTORY OF THE
JURsPRUDENCE or LOUiSIANA, 1 LA. L. JNL. 15, 16.
91 See my Franco-American Codes, 19 VA. L. REV. 351.
92 EssAYs IN ANGLO-SAxoN LAW (1876), 6.
93 See Hofmeyer's 2d. ed. (1861).
94 Meek, Iboo Law (In Essays presented to Seligman, 1934), 209.
95 ANCIENT LAW, 12.
06 A GENERAL VIEW Or EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY (1927), 296.
97 LEs PRINCIPES SOCIOLOGIQUES DU DROIT CIVIL (1906), reprinted in trans.,
EVOLUTION OF LAW SER. III, 577. Cf. SCUTLLER, CUSTOM TX CLASSICAL Ro,-mw
LAW, 24 Va. L. Rev. 269.
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by an accumulation of rules announced in particular cases.
At first this appears to have been little more than a con-
tinuation of the function exercised by the priestly class.
Thus, among the Hebrews,we behold the beginnings of torah
(law) in decisions (toroth) which, according to Sulzberger,9"
"from the time when the oracle took jurisdiction of certain cases, down
to the latest period when judges of ordinary law courts presided, con-
stituted an ancillary body of oral, or common, law."
So in Rome, the pontiffs were "the repository of those pri-
meval customs which formed the first Roman law" and threw
"into the form of general rules, such applications of general
custom and opinion as required declaration or penal enforce-
ment." 11 But
"In the Roman republic the law finding power of the priests passed
to secular jurists; 100 in the Germanic tribes, after their conversion to
Christianity it passed to secular law-speakers. Neither Roman jurists
nor secular law-speakers, rendered judgments ... immediately capable
of execution; but the Roman judices and the German folk-moots reg-
ularly took their law from these law finders." 101
So
"in the Frankish empire the Scabini,1 - and in Scandinavia 103 the later
lagmen became official law-finders. The customary law of medieval
98 Ante n. 45 at p. 8.
99 CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE (Cambridge, 1883), 284.
100 "It was in fact, under the mixed system of customary and imperial law,
that the Roman praetor effected his important evolution." DE LA GRASSERE, ante
n. 100 at p. 582.
101 SmITH, ante n. 96.
102 4 ENCYc. OF THE SoCIAL SCIENCES, 664.
103 The lagman or law-speaker was the earliest custodian of Scandinavian
law. In Iceland he was "Bound, both here at the Al-Ting and at home, to say
to anyone who asked him thereon, what the law commands; but he is not bound
any further to give folk advice in their lawsuits. He shall also recite the Ting
rules of procedure every summer and all the other law provisions he shall recite at
every period of three summers, in case a majority of the law court men wish to
hearken thereto; the first Friday of the Ting-session shall the Ting rules of pro-
cedure be recited, in case the law-court men have time to hearken thereto." Gragas
(German Graugas) "earliest code of the Scandinavian north ...one of the most
important sources used by Wilda" (Das Strafrecht Germanem, 7-61). HOwARD,
DEvELoPMENT OF THE Ki-'s PEACE AND THE ENGLISH PEACE MAGISTRACY, 1 Ne-
braska Univ. Studies, iii, 17.
In the final, Icelandic struggle between the native religion and Christianity
"the Christian men chose as their speaker, Hall of .the side; but Hall went to
Thorgeir. the priest of Lightwater, the old speaker of the law, and gave him three
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Germany 10 4 grew from the findings of the sckhffen, or lay judges;
doubtful cases were resolved by the adoption of a doom, i. e. a declara-
tion as to the nature of the rule of customary law, after an official in-
quiry by the local law finders."
VI. CLASSES.
The same superficial thinking which led to the assumption
that primitive man has no law, appears in the later notion
that "with the description of crime and punishment the sub-
ject of jurisprudence is exhausted as far as a savage com-
munity is concerned." 106
But the new school points out that
"there exists a class of binding rules which control most aspects of
tribal life, which regulate personal relations between kinsmen, clansmen
and tribesmen, settle economic relations, the exercise of power and of
magic, the status of husband and wife and of their respective families.
These are the rules of a Melanesian community which correspond to
our civil law," which "consists, then, of a body of binding obligations,
regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the
other." 106
Under the Mohammedan legal system, "custom which is
recognized as having the force of law must be generally
prevalent in a country." 107 But English writers recognize
marks of silver (the lawful fee) to utter what the law should be." (Njals Saga,
reprinted in trans., 1 EVOLUTION or LAw San. 147).
In a later controversy, "Flosi said to Eyjolf, 'Can this be law?' Eyjolf
said he had not wisdom enough to know that for a surety; and then they sent a
man to Skapi, the speaker of the law, to ask whether it were good law; and he
sent them back word that it was surely good law. though few knew it." lb. 194.
104 "In Germany, during the Middle Ages, the courts were composed of a
judge (Richter) and Schaffen. The Richter presided, kept order and gave judg-
ment, but on a doubtful point of law he took the opinion of the Sch6ffen... .They
took a variety of forms . . . as general rules . . . as answers to hypothetical cases
. . . as opinions in particular real cases. These last availed, it would seem not
only in the cases in which they were delivered , but also as binding in future cases
in the. same court and, as having a weight beyond their intrinsic merits in other
courts." SinT1, TaE DEVELOPMENT or EuROPEAN LAW (N. Y. 1928.)
105 MALINOWSKr, ante n. 11 at p. 56.
106 lb. 58, 66.
1617 ADDER RAame, ante n. 37.
43
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also "particular" customs, which include not only these local
ones but also those "which obtain only within a class." I0s
"Such," observes Blackstone, 10" "are many particular customs with-
in the city of London, with regard to trade, apprentices, widows, orphans
and a variety of other matters. All these are contrary to the general
law of the land and are good only by special usage; though the cus-
toms of London are also confirmed by act of Parliament."
So Salmond 11o found that
"Much of the common law itself applies to particular classes of per-
sons only. The law of solicitors, of auctioneers or of pawnbrokers, is
of very restricted application; yet it is just as truly a part of the com-
mon law as is the law of theft, homicide or libel."
VII. SURVIVALS.
"Custom still exists in every country," said Holland."'
Among the Ifugao, "the customary law embraces that which
pertains to property, inheritance, water rights and, to a great
extent, family law and procedure." 1' According to Maine," 3
"Indian law may be... affirmed to consist of a very great number
of local bodies of usage and of one set of customs, reduced to writing,
pretending to a diviner authority than the rest, exercising, consequently,
a greater influence over them .... The preservation, during a number
of centuries, which it would be vain to calculate, of this great body of
unwritten custom, differing locally in detail, but connected by com-
mon, general features, is a phenomenon which the jurist must not pass
over."
According to Schiller," 4 "all admit that in pre-classical
times most of the (Roman) law was customary in origin...
108 SALmoN, ante n. 33 at p. 43. e. g. Malinowski found "independent legal
systems" for the tribal chieftain and the village headman." Ante n. 11 at p. 76.
Cf. 46.
109 1 COMMENtARiES, 179.
110 Ante n. 33.
111 Ante n. 30 at p. 57.
112 BARTON, ante n. 27 at p. 14.
1.13 VILroAE COMMUNITIs (7th ed., 1895), 52, 55.
114 Custom in Classical Roman Law, 24 VA. LAw REv. 275. He mentions
"five situations in the (classical) private law which . .. are described as being of
customary origin . . ." (1) prohibited degrees in matrimony, (2) substitution of
minors as heirs, (3) "invalidity of gifts between spouses, (4) necessity of tutor's
approval of pupil's undertakings, (5) solidarity of bankers in expensilatio." Says
MumHEA (ante n. 79, at p. 16): "We look in vain for any legislative enactment
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and even in classical times some of the law was of this na-
ture." Writing before the Soviet era, Kurkunov 115 declared
that "judicial usage, and above all, customs, play an exceed-
ingly important part in Russia." In Scotland "we are ruled
in the first place by our ancient and immemorial customs
which may be called our common law." '
England is a country where customary law has had an
unique development beyond the primitive stage. In the Saxon
period law was largely customary (in fact the earliest writ-
ten laws were mainly concerned with blood feud restriction)
and each tribe kingdom had its own. But as the kingdom
gradually merged into the general English realm, the for-
mer's legal system came to be regarded as local custom; and
at least as early as the 12th century, there was no other cus-
tom than local. Glanvill'" mentions conflicting customs
(VII, iii) and those of different localities (ib. v) but, appar-
ently not the custom of England. Bracton '18 remarks by
way of introduction:
"There are also in England various and divers customs according to
the diversity of places. For the English have much by custom which
they have not by lex; as in divers counties, cities, boroughs and vihs;
where inquiry must always be made as to the custom of the place....
Custom is likewise at times, observed for law in parts where it has been
sanctioned by habitual usage; and it takes the place of law; for the
authority of long usage and custom is not slight."
Did this local custom ever become the custom of England?
Only, it seems, when incorporated into the "Rules of the
establishing such an institution, e. g., as the patria potestas or fixing the early rules
of successsion. . . . Statute (lex) may have regulated some of their details; but
they had taken shape and consistency before Rome had its beginnings"
It can well be believed, however, that in the outset the customs in ob-
servance may have been far from uniform; that not only those of the different
races but those of the different gentes may at first have varied in some respects,
but undergoing a gradual approximation and in course of time consolidating into
a general ius quiritium."
115 THEORY or LAW (Hastings trans.), 435.
116 LORD STAIR, INSTITUTES, I, i, (xvi) Cf. For custom in Scots' law see
LORD MAcMILLAN'S INTRODUCTORY SURVEY (Edinburg, 1936) 163.
117 DE LxEcmus ANGLIArE.
11s DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS AxGI.IAE, fol. I. 2; Woodbine's ed., II,
19, 22, following the Twiss trans.
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King's Court." For "the most important of all customs," ac-
cording to Pollock & Maitland, n" "is the custom of the
King's Court ... the custom of England," which "becomes
the common law." ' Holdsworth 121 adds: "We must look to
the rules of the King's Court for the foundations of the com-
mon law. "But, ask Monroe Smith,122 "If the English com-
mon law is not the general English custom, what is it?"
From all this we may at least conclude that "Natural
Law," in considerable proportions, despite the attempts of
legislatures, in various jurisdictions, to make it "Positive
Law" by reenacting" it, is with Us stil].
Charles Sumner Lobingier.
Washington, D. C.
119 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, (2d ed., 1923), I, 183.
120 "Common law, which . .. comes into use in, or shortly after, Edward I,"
is (1) unenacted law (distinguished from statutes and ordinances; (2) common
to the whQle land (distinguished from local customs); (3) of the temporal courts
(distinguished from ecclesiastical law). MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, (Cam-
bridge, 1902) 22.
"The term jus commune was employed by the canonists to describe the
law common to the universal church, as opposed to the special laws governing the
provincial churches. As adopted by the English lawyers of the 13th century, be-
sides this implication of universality, it came to be especially opposed to that, then
very scanty, species of law which is made by statute. (See Maitland in 11 ENGLISH
HiST. Rav. 448) Sir Frederick Pollock, in Eccvc. OF ThE LAWS OF ENGLAND, S. V.
'Common Law,' cites the Dialogue of the Exchequer (ca. 1180) as opposing the
commune regni jus to vetus principium institutio. The old gemeines Deutsches
recht was Roman, as modified by the Canon law. (Cf. the use of Scots' Acts of
Parliament of the 16th century) New 'common law' for the larger portion of Ger-
many, is now provided by the codes." Holland, ante n. 30 at 59.
"Leges et Consuetudinibus regni has been a regular, collective name of
English law since the latter half of the 12th century at the latest" and was an ac-
cepted name for the common law as a whole from an early time." Porocx, FnsT
BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE (1929), 253 sq., Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67.
121 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed., 1923), II, 192.
122 A GENERAL VIEw Or EUROPEA" LEGAL HisTORY, (New York, 1927) 282.
